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The Separation and Reunification of Germany: Rethinking a Natural 
Experiment Interpretation of the Enduring Effects of Communism* 
Sascha O. Becker, Lukas Mergele, and Ludger Woessmann† 
Abstract 
German separation in 1949 into a communist East and a capitalist West and their reunification 
in 1990 are commonly described as a natural experiment to study the enduring effects of 
communism. We show in three steps that the populations in East and West Germany were far 
from being randomly selected treatment and control groups. First, the later border is already 
visible in many socio-economic characteristics in pre-World War II data. Second, World War 
II and the subsequent occupying forces affected East and West differently. Third, a selective 
fifth of the population fled from East to West Germany before the building of the Wall in 1961. 
In light of our findings, we propose a more cautious interpretation of the extensive literature on 
the enduring effects of communist systems on economic outcomes, political preferences, 
cultural traits, and gender roles.  
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German separation in 1949 into the German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany and its reunification in 1990 seem to offer a unique setting of a rather 
unexpected introduction and termination of a communist regime in one part of a previously and 
afterward unified country. Analyzing East-West differences in Germany provides the 
opportunity to study effects of living in different political systems, which has general relevance 
for our understanding of the fundamentals of economic preferences and behavior. This paper 
shows that because of pre-existing differences and early selective migration, German division 
and reunification do not provide a straightforward case of a natural experiment. Taking these 
challenges into account, it summarizes what can be learned from the literature that studies how 
individuals who lived in East and West Germany differed at reunification and how these 
differences have evolved since then.  
Under the communist regime, economic and general well-being of the East German 
population fell far behind the development in the West, as shown in Figure 1. While it is 
impossible to estimate a precise causal effect of communism on economic prosperity and 
personal freedom, it is clear that by the end of the 1980s, people in the West were immensely 
better off in terms of GDP per capita and life expectancy.1 Maybe more surprisingly, while life 
expectancy in the East has converged quickly to the Western level after reunification, the 
convergence of economic activity has stalled after an initial surge—despite continuing major 
transfers from West to East. Many scholars of transition economics had expected that changing 
the system would suffice to ensure convergence, as undoing the artificial distortions that central 
planning imposed on the economy would let it return to its natural market orientation. Initial 
decisions about converting East German marks at 1:1 parity, how to carry out privatization, and 
other policy choices may have contributed to the path of East German economic activity after 
reunification. But a growing literature emphasizes that living under communism may have 
changed people’s attitudes and preferences more deeply, giving rise to much more enduring 
effects even after the end of the political regime—and suggesting that transitions are about more 
than removing policy distortions.  
Still, even though East Germans were unlikely to anticipate that their choices under 
communism might be suboptimal under an alternative regime, learning about the effects of 
communism based on the experience of German division and reunification poses unique 
challenges. To be considered a natural experiment, the exposure to different political systems 
                                                 
1 GDP estimates for the communist East should be interpreted with care because the lack of market prices makes 
well-founded GDP calculation impossible and because of potential misreporting.  
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would have to be unrelated to any other characteristics of the population that may be related to 
the outcomes of interest.  
In the first sections of this paper, we highlight several sources of endogeneity that would 
violate the interpretation of the differential exposure to political systems as natural experiments. 
First, the drawing of the border between East and West Germany was not random. We 
demonstrate that substantial differences in economic structures, political preferences, cultural 
traits, and gender roles between what later became East and West Germany existed well before 
World War II. Second, East and West Germany were differentially affected by the war and by 
the dismantling of infrastructure and reparations to the occupying forces in the immediate after-
war period. Third, roughly one-fifth of the East German population moved to West Germany 
between 1945 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and this out-migration was likely 
selective with respect to political and economic preferences. Prior literature considers some of 
these aspects but tends to miss important pre-existing differences by using rough measures or 
by aggregating data that combine the area of what would later become the German Democratic 
Republic with areas that would be part of Poland. For this paper, we collect fine-grained data 
on a broad series of indicators at the county level that allow us to provide a clearer picture of 
pre-existing differences. Together, this evidence suggests that we might expect substantial 
differences in attitudes between individuals who lived in East and in West Germany even in the 
absence of differential exposure to political systems.  
We then turn to an overview of the available evidence about Germany’s experience of 
separation and reunification on enduring differences in economic outcomes, political attitudes, 
cultural traits, and gender roles. We do not attempt a formal reworking of any of this literature, 
but instead focus on whether the central results of various studies are likely to have an upward 
or downward bias when aspects of pre-existing historical differences, differential treatment 
during World War II and the occupation period, and German-German migration before the 
Berlin Wall are taken into account.  
Our discussion also suggests a broader lesson beyond the effects of German 
reunification. There is a wide literature exploring how political systems persistently affect the 
economy and population preferences, with a particular focus on different legacies between 
capitalist and socialist societies (for a review, see Simpser et al. 2018). Studies examining a 
major political event, like the arrival or departure of communism or other forms of autocracy, 
might face similar challenges when interpreting the before-and-after differences as a natural 
experiment. The ways in which borders were originally drawn, events that took place during 
the transition, and patterns of in- or out-migration are often important. Thus, we are proposing 
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the need for a reinterpretation of the existing literature on the “effects” of communism and call 
for a closer consideration of the formation of political systems more generally.  
Pre-existing Differences between East and West Germany 
Historical Background: How the Border Got Drawn  
The location of the border between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is not the random outcome of where American, British, 
and Soviet tanks stopped at the end of World War II in 1945. Instead, in anticipation of the 
defeat of Nazi Germany, the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet 
Union agreed on the formation of the European Advisory Commission at the Moscow 
Conference on October 30, 1943, which was confirmed at the Tehran Conference in November. 
The commission was asked to explore the political framework for postwar Europe and to make 
recommendations to the three governments (Kowalski 1971).  
Based on the recommendations of the European Advisory Commission, the post-World 
War II border between East and West Germany was agreed upon in the so-called London 
Protocol, signed on September 12, 1944. The American, British, and Soviet armies were each 
allocated a zone of occupation of roughly equal population size. Berlin was to be jointly 
occupied. Two changes were made later: First, an additional French zone was carved out of the 
American and British zones. Second, parts of the Soviet zone were given to Poland (so that the 
Soviet-Polish border followed the “Oder-Neisse line”), and Poland became a Soviet satellite 
country. Neither change affected the German-German border, which separated the Soviet zone 
from those of the Western allies.  
Figure 2 shows that the border between the Soviet and the Western occupation zones 
followed the pre-World War II borders of states of the German Empire and provinces of the 
largest state of Prussia (with a few very minor exceptions for geographic connectedness).2 As 
a result, the German-German border separated the populations of pre-existing regions with 
distinct histories and cultures. The British delegation to the European Advisory Commission 
argued that this approach allowed to “encourage rather than […] prejudice any separatist or 
particularist tendencies,” providing a safeguard against a revival of the former German state 
(Foreign Relations of the United States 1968, pp. 150ff). The border thus was entirely different 
                                                 
2 The minor exceptions where post-World War II borders deviated from pre-war province or state borders are 
marginal areas near Ratzeburg, Amt Neuhaus where no bridge crossed the river Elbe, the Hessian county 
Herrschaft Schmalkalden, and the Eastern bit of county Blankenburg. All these areas risked isolation in their 
original zone of occupation and were exchanged between zones to facilitate connectivity with their neighborhood.  
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from the end-of-war frontline between the Red Army and the US and British armies. Indeed, 
by May 1945 the Western armies had already pushed deeply into what later became East 
German territory, but handed over control to the Soviets once German defeat was accomplished, 
thereby honoring the agreement made in the London Protocol. In 1949, the Soviet occupation 
zone became the German Democratic Republic, and the Allied occupation zones became the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
Given that the border between East and West Germany was a deliberate choice and 
followed pre-existing provincial boundaries, the populations living in the two parts may have 
differed already before the advent of communism in the East. Analyzing pre-World War II data 
for counties of what would later become the German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, we find important pre-existing East-West differences in several 
measures of economic outcomes, political preferences, culture, and gender roles.  
Economic Outcomes  
To investigate whether East-West differences in economic structures predate the 
division into East and West Germany, we draw on data from the 1925 German Census compiled 
by Falter and Hänisch (1990) (see also Hänisch 1989). Restricting the analysis to what would 
later be East and West Germany, the county-level data allow us to compare 202 counties in the 
East to 652 counties in the West. Figure 3 illustrates that the working-class structure of the 
GDR population predates its existence: The East-West border is apparent already before World 
War II, with the working-class share substantially higher in what would later become the GDR.  
Using these data in regression analyses, the first entry in the first row of Table 1 shows 
that the share of blue-collar workers in the total labor force in the West was 35.6 percent.3 The 
second row shows that this share was 11.8 percentage points higher in the counties that would 
later become part of East Germany. In addition, the working-class share jumps abruptly in 
several regions around the later inner-German border, especially in the southwest and the south 
of what later becomes East Germany. As shown in the remaining columns of Table 1, the 
difference in working-class shares is just as apparent when focusing on the 468 counties within 
200 kilometers of the later border or the 244 counties within 100 kilometers of the later border 
                                                 
3 The numbers in Table 1 are based on a series of separate regressions, using county-level data. For details on these 
regressions, see the online Appendix available with this paper at the JEP website. For additional results and more 
detail on pre-existing differences between East and West Germany, see Table A1 and Figures A1-A4 in the 
Appendix. While the inner-German border provides a clean separation of pre-World War II counties into East and 
West Germany (as discussed above), several pre-World War II counties straddled across both sides of the Oder 
and Neisse rivers that formed the later GDR-Polish border. We include all those counties in our analysis whose 
county capital is part of the later East Germany. Berlin is excluded from the analysis throughout. 
5 
(analyses that also entail a more balanced number of counties on either side of the border). A 
difference of 7.3 percentage points even shows up when narrowing the analysis to only those 
59 counties that have a direct contact with the later border.4  
The difference in occupational structure is also reflected in the sectoral composition of 
the economy, where the employment share in manufacturing (industry and crafts) is 8.3 
percentage points larger in the Eastern compared to Western counties of Germany, where it was 
35.7 percentage points. When restricting the analysis to counties within 100 or 200 kilometers 
of the later border, the difference is even larger at more than 11 percentage points. The larger 
manufacturing share in East Germany mirrors the reverse pattern in the agricultural sector. 
While the agricultural employment share was 35.2 percent in the West, it was only 22.4 percent 
in the East. By contrast, there are hardly any East-West differences in average employment 
shares in sectors reflecting basic services such as administration, domestic services, and the 
health sector. For example, health-sector employment shares do not differ significantly between 
counties in the East and the West.  
Given the important difference between planned and market economies in allowing for 
entrepreneurship and self-employment, the literature on contemporaneous East-West 
differences places a strong focus on these outcomes. However, the self-employment share was 
substantially lower in the East than in the West already in 1925 (Fritsch and Wyrwich 2014). 
As shown in Table 1, the difference is 8.4 percentage points on average and endures when 
focusing on counties closer to the later border.  
The pervasive differences in economic structure are consistent with an analysis of trade 
flows between different parts of the country. Wolf (2009) shows that the German Empire was 
a poorly integrated economy before 1914 and (only) “reasonably well integrated” by the end of 
the Weimar Republic.  
Political Preferences  
To analyze pre-existing political preferences, a natural starting point is to look at vote 
shares for the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) 
before World War II. During the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), regular elections for the 
Reichstag were held throughout Germany. We study county-level data on vote shares of 
                                                 
4 These discontinuous differences around what would later become the GDR border indicate that even spatial 
regression discontinuity designs around the East-West border may be affected by pre-existing heterogeneity. 
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different parties in the national Reichstag election of December 1924.5 The second panel of 
Table 1 illustrates that counties that would later become part of East Germany have a 
communist vote share that is 4.9 percentage points higher compared to the West’s 5.0 percent, 
and thus nearly twice as high. This difference is even larger, at close to 7 percentage points, 
when focusing on the counties within 100 or 200 kilometers of the later border.  
The East-West difference is even larger when considering all left-wing parties, which 
include the much larger Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
SPD) in addition to the KPD, as well as the negligible USPD. In the West, 25.4 percent of voters 
supported these parties, while the left-party vote share was 15.2 percentage points larger in the 
East, totaling 40.6 percent.6 The stronger support for communist and left-wing parties is likely 
linked to the larger working-class and manufacturing shares indicated above.  
Clearly, studies looking at Germany’s separation and reunification cannot implicitly 
assume that the regions—or even the areas relatively close to the border—were originally 
similar in their political leanings. Results for vote shares of other political parties indicate that 
the larger preferences for left-wing parties in the East come largely at the detriment of vote 
shares for the Catholic center-right Zentrum party. This relates to the fact that the Zentrum party 
was the focal party of Catholics in Germany, and since counties in the East were predominantly 
Protestant (as discussed next), Zentrum had lower vote shares in those areas. The electoral data 
also reveal that East and West varied in voter turnout, which was 5 percentage points higher in 
the East. This difference disappears, however, when restricting the analysis to counties within 
100 kilometers of the later East German border.  
Culture 
One dimension of cultural differences that is available in historical census data is 
religious denomination. The share of Protestants was higher in the East than in the West, which 
partly reflects that Martin Luther’s city of Wittenberg is situated in the middle of what would 
become East Germany (Becker and Woessmann 2009). In the 1925 German census, 91 percent 
of the population in the Eastern counties was Protestant, compared to only 49 percent in the 
Western counties, as shown in the third panel of Table 1. The difference becomes smaller when 
                                                 
5 The December 1924 election provides an informative example as it took place after the establishment of the 
Weimar electoral system but before the rise of National Socialism, which disrupted the existing party system by 
becoming the first “mass-integration party” (for example, Falter 2014). Still, we find qualitatively similar results 
for other elections such as May 1924 and May 1928.  
6 In the May 1924 election, the East-West differences are even larger at 7.4 percentage points (around 10 
percentage points in the border subsamples) for the communist vote share and 19.7 percentage points for the left 
vote share (not shown). 
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zooming in on counties situated closer to one another, but it is still 24.0 percentage points in 
the sample of counties within 100 kilometers of what later became the German-German border.7  
Echoing the larger Protestant share, the share of Catholics in the East was 43.8 
percentage points smaller compared to the 49.1 percent in the West. The share of Jewish 
population was slightly but significantly lower in the East, albeit at a very low level of 0.2 
percent compared to 0.5 percent in the West. However, Berlin—which had by far the largest 
Jewish community in the German Empire but was divided between East and West—is excluded 
in this analysis.  
Beyond denominational affiliation, statistical surveys of the Protestant Regional 
Churches of Germany on the “Expressions of Churchly Life” provide an historically unique 
indicator of church attendance. Based on headcounts combined in Sacrament Statistics 
(Abendmahlsstatistik), the measure refers to the number of participations in Holy Communion 
relative to the number of Protestants, which was used by contemporaries as a proxy for 
churchliness (see also Becker and Woessmann 2013, 2018; Becker et al. 2017). We follow 
Hölscher (2001), who gathered the data at the level of church districts (Kirchenkreise) from 
regional archives and focuses on the year 1910 because of broad data coverage, but we use the 
average of the data available for the years 1900-1910 to reduce measurement error.  
Church attendance at this time was substantially lower to the East of what later became 
the East German border. As shown in Table 1, participations in Holy Communion were 16.3 
percentage points lower among East German Protestants, compared to an average of 55.4 
percent among West German Protestants. This difference is robust in the smaller bands around 
the border and holds even for the counties contiguous to the border. Hölscher (2001, p. 7) notes: 
“A look at the map of Protestant Communion participation in 1910 […] already reveals the later 
German dividing border before the First World War between Hesse and Thuringia. This 
suggests the conjecture that […] in large parts of East Germany it was not the socialist regime 
that first eroded and undermined ecclesiastical life, but rather that, conversely, an already older 
unchurchliness in these regions paved the way for the reception of socialist […] convictions.”  
Gender Roles 
With respect to gender roles in the labor market, the 1925 census provides employment 
statistics by gender. Wyrwich (2019) presents county-level data on female labor-force 
participation, measured as the share of women registered as non‐domestic employees within 
                                                 
7 Grashoff (2019) notes that suicide rates during the Weimar Republic were also higher in the East, which he sees 
as a corollary of more widespread Protestantism (Becker and Woessmann 2018). 
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the entire female population. As pointed out in Wyrwich (2017), participation of females in the 
formal labor market was higher on average in East relative to West Germany before World War 
II. At the 1925 county level, female labor-force participation was 6.0 percentage points higher 
in the East compared to the mean of Western counties of 32.5 percent, as shown in the fourth 
panel of Table 1. Again, the significant difference also emerges in the more geographically 
restricted samples.8  
In addition, Klüsener and Goldstein (2016) have shown that East-West differences in 
family-formation behavior, as documented in extramarital births, predate the 1945 division of 
Germany. They provide data on extramarital birth ratios in 1937 published by the German 
Imperial Statistical Office, confirming that extramarital fertility was higher on average in the 
East. As shown in Table 1, the difference amounts to 3.3 percentage points on average, 
compared to the Western mean of 6.7 percent. This difference is also evident in the restricted 
samples. 
Overall, our analysis documents remarkable historical differences in economic 
outcomes, political preferences, culture, and gender roles between the populations living in the 
regions that were to become East and West Germany. Well before World War II, people in the 
later East Germany were more likely to be working class and to work in manufacturing, less 
likely to be self-employed, and more favorable to communist and left-wing political parties. 
The East had higher Protestant shares, lower church attendance, higher female labor-force 
participation, and higher extramarital fertility. To the extent that such pre-existing differences 
persist through the communist period, they may well be an essential source of post-reunification 
heterogeneities between East and West Germans.  
Differential Affectedness by World War II and Occupying Forces 
A further source of East-West differences is the potentially differential effect of World 
War II itself on the different parts of Germany, as well as potential differences in the treatment 
received during the years 1945-1949, when East and West Germany were occupied by Soviet 
and Allied Western armies, respectively. Economic historians have long noted differences in 
labor productivity in manufacturing between East and West Germany predating World War II. 
                                                 
8 Campa and Serafinelli (2019) find the opposite when using the ratio of women employed to total employed, 
which likely results from inclusion of the categories “work in household” and “family members who help out.” 
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Using the 1936 Manufacturing Census, van Ark (1996) shows that sales per employee in East 
Germany amounted to only 84 percent of the level in West Germany.9 
In his comprehensive comparison of the East German and West German economies, 
Sleifer (2006) notes that after 1944, the East and West German industrial capital stocks showed 
a strongly divergent development. This is not the result of larger damage due to war activity, 
but largely attributed to the dismantling of East Germany’s industrial capital stock by the Soviet 
Union. Baar et al. (1995) estimate that East Germans paid much more than West Germans 
(2,784 vs. 1,611 Reichsmarks per capita) in terms of total war damages, dismantling, 
reparations, and occupation costs (see Sleifer 2006, Table 4.3). The difference is mainly due to 
higher reparations (1,065 vs. 23 Reichsmarks per capita) and higher losses due to dismantling 
of capital equipment (384 vs. 60 Reichsmarks per capita) in the East.10 
Overall, while the West German industrial capital stock in 1948 was higher than in 1936, 
the East German capital stock was at only 69 percent of its 1936 level (Sleifer 2006). 
Considering that the East German manufacturing sector was already at a disadvantage in 1936, 
this means that it had fallen significantly further behind by the time the German Democratic 
Republic was established. 
Another indication of differences arising between East and West already before the 
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany were officially founded in 
1949 can be seen when looking at sex ratios, computed as the number of men to women. We 
digitized county-level data from the German Census jointly administered in all four occupation 
zones on October 29, 1946. The sex ratios in the four occupation zones (excluding Berlin) were 
0.820 in the American zone, 0.835 in the British zone, 0.790 in the French zone, and 0.743 in 
the Soviet zone. There had been no such differences in 1939, in the last pre-World War II 
census, when sex ratios varied only between 0.954 and 0.974 across the four areas. The larger 
decrease in sex ratios in the Soviet zone may reflect a combination of a larger fraction of war 
casualties as well as sex imbalances in very early East-West migration. Whatever the source, 
considering the well-known implications of imbalances in sex ratios for labor-market outcomes 
(for example, Angrist 2002), these differences might have contributed to differences in several 
outcomes of interest, such as female labor-force participation, gender roles, and even political 
outcomes. 
                                                 
9 This lower productivity of the manufacturing sector counteracted the larger share of manufacturing in the East. 
Pre-World War II GDP per capita was not very different between West and East Germany (see Figure 1 above). 
10 War damages are actually lower in East Germany compared to the West (686 vs. 839 Reichsmarks per capita), 
and the costs of occupation are roughly similar (649 vs. 689 Reichsmarks per capita). 
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Overall, war-related damages and differences between occupying forces in the Soviet 
and non-Soviet zones implied that the GDR was off to a worse start before the new states had 
a chance to develop their own identities.  
Selective Out-migration before the Berlin Wall  
Historical Background: Out-migration between 1945 and 1961  
The Soviet Occupation Zone was established in East Germany right after the end of 
World War II in 1945, culminating in the foundation of the German Democratic Republic in 
1949. Although the freedom of movement was restricted, the “iron curtain” was at first by no 
means impenetrable. Throughout the 1950s, people could move rather freely between the East 
and West sectors of Berlin, resulting in substantial East-West migration. These movements only 
ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.  
Statistics about migration from the Soviet Occupation Zone to the Western Occupation 
Zones during the years 1945-1949 are considered somewhat problematic. Plausible estimates 
from Heidemeyer (1994, Table 2) suggest that about 875,000 residents of the Soviet Occupation 
Zone moved to the Western Occupation Zones during the years 1944/45-1949. Statistics for the 
years 1950 to 1961 are considered more reliable. Van Melis (2006, Table 1) presents monthly 
statistics on migration from East Germany into West Berlin and West Germany between 
September 1950 and December 1961 that add up to 2.75 million East-West migrants. 
Comparing the estimated East-West migration over the entire 1945-1961 period to the roughly 
18 million inhabitants in the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1946, about one-fifth of East 
Germany’s population migrated West until 1961, when the Iron Curtain was completed and 
East-West migration was all but shut down. 
Evidence on the Selectivity of East-to-West Migration  
The evidence on the selectivity of this East-West migration is suggestive, although not 
conclusive. Economic research suggests in general that migrants tend to be people who are 
more willing to take matters into their own hands than stayers, more entrepreneurial, and 
selected along other dimensions (for example, Borjas 1987; Grogger and Hanson 2011; Fairlie 
and Lofstrom 2015; Parey et al. 2017). More specifically, it seems likely that those who left the 
East for the West had less preference for a communist system and were more supportive of a 
capitalist one, on average. This applies to ordinary citizens and leading politicians alike. In 
1945, the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU)—the party of Konrad Adenauer and Angela 
11 
Merkel—was founded across all zones of occupation, including the Soviet one. In the first years 
after 1945, the CDU had several ministers in zone-wide or state-level governments in the East. 
However, all CDU ministers resigned (voluntarily or by force) and migrated to the West. The 
Soviet occupation forces and the later East German government also expropriated many large 
landowners and used de-Nazification to expel not only Nazis but also those they perceived as 
critical to communist rule (Jessen 1999).  
Using West German datasets, we can compare some characteristics of those who moved 
from the East to the West with people who had always been in the West (see also 
Bauernschuster et al. 2012). Data from a retrospective survey in the German Microcensus 1971, 
which covers a representative 1 percent sample of the German population, allow us to compare 
characteristics of those individuals who left the Soviet Occupation Zone and then the GDR in 
its early days with local West Germans. Table 2 shows that early East-West movers were more 
likely than local West Germans to be white-collar workers (30.4 vs. 20.3 percent), civil servants 
(13.5 vs. 6.1 percent), or self-employed (10.1 vs. 7.2 percent).11 There is a related selection on 
education: early East-West movers were much more likely to have more than basic schooling 
(60.8 percent) than local West Germans (39.2 percent). Furthermore, Bauernschuster et al. 
(2012) present evidence from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) 1991-2004 
showing that those who had left the East for the West before 1961 see a lesser role for the state 
than the original West Germans. 
There is also some anecdotal evidence for selection on age, health, and family status. 
The president of the Statistical Office of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ), Bruno Gleitze, 
remarked that “the Soviet Occupation Zone acted like a sieve, holding back the aged, sick and 
single” (“die SBZ [wirkte] wie ein Sieb, das Alte, Kranke und Alleinstehende zurückhielt”, 
cited according to Steiner 2013, p. 14). 
Recently, Eder and Halla (2018) argue that a substantial part of East-West migration 
towards the end of World War II was due to concerns about the advancing Soviet Army. They 
suggest that the dominant motive of migration in those years was escaping physical assault by 
the Soviet army, not avoiding the socialist regime. Their evidence shows that these migrants 
are strongly positively selected on skills. 
Together, these analyses indicate that individuals staying in East Germany differed from 
those who moved to the West in being less likely to be white-collar workers or self-employed, 
less educated, and probably more receptive to the communist doctrine. Furthermore, the large 
                                                 
11 We are grateful to Oliver Falck for extensive support in producing this table. 
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majority of emigrants from East Germany went to live in West Germany, as opposed to moving 
to a different country outside Germany, thus becoming part of the West in East-West 
comparisons. Therefore, any post-reunification differences observed between people who lived 
in the East and people who lived in the West may also be the result of this earlier pattern of 
selection, rather than just of living under a communist system in the German Democratic 
Republic. 
A Note on Selective West-to-East Migration  
About half a million people migrated from the West to the East before 1961. One 
prominent example is German chancellor Angela Merkel, who was born in Hamburg in 1954 
and moved to East Germany as an infant when her father, a Lutheran clergyman, received a 
pastorate in Brandenburg. While there is no reliable data on the composition of the West-East 
migration, it seems likely that—in addition to return migrants—mostly individuals committed 
to (or at least tolerant of) the communist idea would have moved this way. Propaganda from 
the East German government named various motives for such migration, including young men 
trying to escape compulsory military service in the West or those not in agreement with the 
capitalist system.  
We collected data showing that a considerable share of the Politburo members in the 
early German Democratic Republic had been born in the West. In the years 1949-1961—the 
years between the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and the construction of the 
Berlin Wall—the East German Politburo had 19 members in total. Of these, 10 were born in 
the territory of what later became East German area or in Berlin, three were born in areas outside 
the later East or West Germany, and six were born in what became West Germany. While some 
of these Politburo members had lived in Berlin before World War II, they deliberately selected 
into building the East German state. As a prominent example, Erich Honecker, born in the Saar 
area near the French border in what later became West Germany, joined the Politburo in 1958 
and was the last leader of the German Democratic Republic when the Berlin Wall came down 
in 1989. Some of the most strongly convinced communists in the East came from the West. 
Re-interpreting Evidence on the Effects of Communism in Germany 
In light of our evidence for pre-existing East-West differences, differential effects of 
World War II and subsequent occupying forces, and selective East-West migration, the question 
arises whether the previous literature potentially over- or underestimates the effects of 
communism when this history is taken into account. Generally speaking, in cases where some 
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of the differences in post-1989 outcomes reflect pre-existing differences, the true effect of living 
in East Germany will be smaller than previous studies suggest. Conversely, in cases where pre-
existing differences are of opposite sign to the ones found after communism, the true effect of 
communism may be even larger. When considering migration, it is important to ask whether it 
is selective with respect to the outcome of interest, because not all outcomes will be equally 
affected by concerns of selective migration.12 While encompassing analyses of these issues are 
generally missing in the literature, some papers make an explicit effort to take them into 
account.  
In this section, we look at some of the rapidly expanding literature on German division 
and reunification, focusing again on the four domains of economic outcomes, political 
preferences, culture, and gender. Table 3 summarizes the papers we cover in terms of data, 
empirical approach, and results. We are not formally re-analyzing the previous work, but 
instead discuss how the interpretation of results might have to be adjusted in light of our 
findings of pre-existing differences and selective migration. 
Economic Outcomes 
In terms of overall economic outcomes, GDP and income per capita did not differ widely 
between East and West Germany before World War II (see Figure 1 and Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln 2007). By the time the GDR collapsed, East German GDP per capita was less than 
half of that of West Germany (see Figure 1 and Sleifer 2006, Graph 3.1). After reunification, 
labor productivity in East Germany was at a third of the Western level, putting the East 
somewhere between Mexico and Chile. Most of the capital stock of the former GDR was 
obsolete or unusable for production in a market economy (Siebert 1991; Akerlof et al. 1991). 
The communist experiment had ended in economic failure.  
How did the communist experience affect subsequent economic behavior of the people 
who had lived under the communist system? The recent literature exploiting German division 
and reunification covers a wide range of economic measures, including entrepreneurship, job 
satisfaction, stock-market participation, savings behavior, and inflation expectations. It is hard 
to draw sweeping conclusions across this range of outcomes, but we will point to some enduring 
effects of communism that are more robust than others to the caveats we describe in the earlier 
sections. We start with areas of direct effects of communism and then move to topics focused 
on developments over the phase after reunification. 
                                                 
12 Arguably, migration unleashed by Soviet occupation or the foundation of the GDR could be defined as part of 
a more broadly defined communist “treatment”. 
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One question studied is whether the centrally planned economy took away the spirit of 
entrepreneurship. Self-employment (which typically overlaps with entrepreneurialism) was 
highly restricted under communism. However, post-reunification differences in 
entrepreneurship seem to be at least partly the result of persistence from before World War II 
rather than a pure result of communism. Even when taking the broader view that selective 
migration before 1961 may be regarded as an effect of communism, Fritsch and Wyrwich 
(2014) document regional persistence of preferences for entrepreneurship between pre-World 
War II and today. However, not all entrepreneurial spirit is gone. Fuchs-Schündeln (2009) 
shows that those who are self-employed in the first ten years after the end of communism 
display higher job satisfaction compared to their retrospective job satisfaction in 1985. 
The GDR offered its citizens very limited opportunities to invest. Stocks were the 
incarnation of a capitalist system that was despised. Laudenbach et al. (2019) present evidence 
that East Germans still invest significantly less in the stock market in the 2000s. It seems that 
the effects are stronger for individuals exposed to stronger communist priming, like those living 
in communist “showcase cities” or cities of Olympic gold medalists. In contrast, East Germans 
with negative experiences—those experiencing greater environmental pollution, suppression of 
religious beliefs, or without access to Western television—invest more in the stock market 
today. These differences are consistent with lasting effects of communism on stock-market 
participation. There are also effects on investment types: Consistent with communist friends-
and-foes propaganda, East Germans are more likely to hold stocks of companies in (ex-) 
communist countries such as China, Russia, and Vietnam. 
Similarly, there is evidence that communism permanently affected savings behavior. 
Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) show that after reunification, precautionary wealth as 
a percentage of all wealth in the East is nearly twice that in the West (22.1 vs. 12.9 percent). 
Using the surprise effect of reunification for identification, they exploit differences of East 
Germans with different occupations based on the idea that the choices made under communism 
were optimal in that context but may suddenly no longer be optimal under the new environment. 
Specifically, while labor-income risk under communism was essentially zero, some 
occupations made for safe civil servant careers after reunification whereas others became risky 
private-sector jobs. German reunification also constitutes a large unanticipated shock to labor 
and retirement incomes, as well as to wealth levels. Fuchs-Schündeln (2008) shows that East 
Germans have higher savings rates after reunification, largely to make up for a perceived gap 
in retirement savings under the new capitalist regime—consistent with a precautionary saving 
motive.  
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Inhabitants of East Germany were used to zero (official) inflation in their centrally 
planned economy.13 Reunification came with a fast increase in prices after the abolishment of 
price controls. Inflation expectations of East Germans continue to be substantially higher than 
those of West Germans, even decades after reunification (Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart 2020). 
Arguably, concerns about pre-existing differences in inflation expectations or selective 
migration on inflation expectations are farfetched in this case. Instead, these results suggest that 
the experience of communism and the subsequent transition shock have had long-lasting effects 
on economic expectations. 
Political Preferences 
The literature also studies whether life under communism permanently affected political 
preferences. In their seminal study, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that former 
residents of the German Democratic Republic differ from those of the Federal Republic of 
German in their thinking about market capitalism and the role of the state in providing social 
services, insurance, and redistribution from the rich to the poor, using data from the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).14 The authors are careful in considering the identification 
challenges we described earlier. They point out that before World War II, income per capita did 
not differ substantially between East and West German states and across Prussian provinces at 
an aggregate level, to the extent that the regions are separable. They also argue that destruction 
during World War II was major but universal in both parts of Germany.15 Addressing inner-
German migration, they argue that self-selection motives are unlikely to be strong enough to 
explain away their effects. Based on our more fine-grained and extensive evidence on pre-
World War II differences in communist vote shares and economic structures as well as selective 
migration by occupation and education, it is conceivable that some of the effect attributed to 
the exposure to the communist political system is the result of pre-existing differences and 
selective migration.  
                                                 
13 Even though state propaganda promoted consumer price stability, residents of East Germany in fact experienced 
substantial hidden inflation, for example, through changes in product lines. Official price statistics did not include 
changes from new and enhanced products (Heske 2009, pp. 154ff). 
14 Relatedly, Corneo and Grüner (2002) found that, in 1992, Eastern Europeans had stronger preferences for 
redistribution than individuals from Western countries. 
15 As discussed above, destruction during World War II was indeed quite similar, but the East was substantially 
more affected by dismantling and reparations. This might well have affected calls for intervention and 
redistribution in the early years of East Germany and should arguably be attributed to Soviet occupation as opposed 
to life under communism in the GDR. 
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A way to circumvent some of these issues of pre-existing differences is to take 1990 as 
the starting point and focus on convergence in attitudes after the fall of communism. Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) present evidence of convergence in preferences after 
reunification, which points to some dynamic influence of political systems in the German 
context. Similarly, Svallfors (2010) documents considerable convergence in attitudes towards 
state intervention between East and West Germany using International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) data for the years 1990, 1996, and 2006. But in this case, a flow of Western-
socialized people to the East could lead to convergence because of changes in ISSP sample 
composition over time. Still, the combined evidence leaves little doubt that communism had 
some enduring effect on political preferences. At the same time, it would be unwise to conclude 
that German reunification can be treated as a natural experiment for any outcome of interest. 
Corroborating evidence is based on differences within East Germany. On some 
accounts, East Germans living close to the inner-German border tended to have harder lives 
during the times of German division: authorities implemented forced relocation of whole 
villages, frequent controls that may have resulted in mental stress, and even more limited 
freedoms than elsewhere in East Germany. Avdeenko (2018) finds that the successor party to 
the GDR’s communist party captures a lower vote share in the border area than in other parts 
of East Germany. Concerns about pre-existing differences are directly addressed by drawing on 
1919-1933 election results. If anything, communist vote shares were higher in the border area 
than in other parts of the later GDR, suggesting that the results of a turn away from communism 
are even stronger once pre-World War II preferences are taken into account. A related 
methodology uses the number of years under communism as a key variable. The German 
Socioeconomic Panel includes time-varying information on political attitudes, in conjunction 
with variation in year of birth and hence time under communism and after communism. Carl 
(2018) shows that those having spent more time under communism in the East, where exposure 
to foreigners was limited, are more opposed to immigration. Measuring exposure to 
communism as a continuous variable reduces some of the concerns about pre-existing 
differences and selective migration. 
It is also revealing to compare West Germans in West Germany to West Germans in 
East Germany and vice versa. Brosig-Koch et al. (2011) run lab experiments with students in 
the cities of Magdeburg (East Germany) and Essen (West Germany) in 1995 and 2009. East 
Germans show consistently less fairness and willingness to cooperate in solidarity games, with 
no convergence in the 20 years after reunification. West German students studying in the East 
differ significantly from those studying in the West. In fact, they show similarities with East 
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German students. The authors see this as consistent with two potential explanations: West 
Germans in East Germany either have partly accommodated to the East German behavioral 
norms or they were more likely to move to the East because they could align themselves better 
to the social behavior in East Germany—which underlines the importance of considering 
selective migration. 
Overall, papers that exclusively look at the extensive margin of exposure to communism 
run a risk of over-estimating treatment effects because of pre-World War II differences in 
communist leanings and selective migration based on preferences for or against communist 
ideas. However, studies that exploit continuous measures of communist experience (e.g., 
geographic variation or time under communism) and those exploiting convergence in political 
preferences after the fall of communism suggest rather long-lasting effects on political 
preferences. 
Culture 
A large literature looks at cross-German outcomes in the area of culture such as trust, 
fairness, self-reliance, time preferences, conspicuous consumption, and tax morale. In many 
areas, cultural values continue to differ between East and West.  
Trust is considered to be one of the most important cultural drivers of economic 
exchange (Arrow 1972). Social trust toward other people is lower in East Germany and does 
not show signs of convergence. Given lower levels of pre-World War II church attendance as 
a measure of community interaction, it seems likely that some of this reflects long-term 
persistence, as opposed to an effect of communism. Evidence from different datasets shows that 
East Germans are significantly less trusting towards other people than West Germans and that 
these attitudes are not converging—see Rainer and Siedler (2009) for the German General 
Social Survey and Heineck and Süssmuth (2013) for the German Socioeconomic Panel. 
Interestingly, however, Rainer and Siedler show that trust in institutions has converged after 
reunification, suggesting political systems matter in this case. Going beyond trust, Heineck and 
Süssmuth find that while East Germans are more risk-loving after reunification, there is 
convergence in risk attitudes between East and West Germans. Looking at differences in 
perceived fairness and cooperation, they find no evidence of convergence between individuals 
in the two parts of Germany. To the extent that there is evidence of convergence after 
reunification in the two studies, concerns about pre-World War II differences and pre-1961 
German-German migration are less warranted. 
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Lower trust in other people can also be seen in higher investment in strong ties such as 
close friends compared to weak ties such as club membership or church attendance. Using the 
German Socioeconomic Panel, Boenisch and Schneider (2013) demonstrate that persons who 
grew up in East Germany exhibit this specific social capital mix, which also corresponds with 
lower geographic mobility. Given our evidence of lower church attendance in the East well 
before World War II, some of this presumed effect of communism likely originates in longer-
term historic differences. 
It is often argued that with its ubiquitous influence on people’s lives, communism led to 
a lack of self-reliance. Bauernschuster et al. (2012) show that this is indeed the case when 
conditioning on regional differences in economic development. But in line with what we 
discussed earlier, they also show that the socialist regime affected the composition of the East 
German population by inducing selective migration before the construction of the Berlin Wall 
in 1961. 
The planned economy of East Germany disappointed its citizens in many ways. Wait 
times for cars could be well over a decade. Not surprisingly, East German doctrine taught 
people to live sparingly and strive for improvement of their performance in the future. 
Consistent with this doctrine, Friehe and Pannenberg (2020) find that former residents of the 
GDR are less present-biased. While the authors address selective East-West migration of 
impatient people by using information about parent’s region of origin and retrospective 
information on East-West migration available in a subsample, pre-World War II differences are 
a potential source of concern. If time preferences vary by some of the dimensions for which we 
uncovered pre-existing East-West differences—say, between blue- and white-collar workers—
part of the apparent effect of communism might reflect long-term persistence.  
Following the theme of communism-induced limits to consumption choices, some 
papers exploit the fact that reunification opened up new consumption opportunities. Friehe and 
Mechtel (2014) show that East Germans display more conspicuous consumption—that is, they 
spend more on items that display high social status. In a similar vein, Dragone and Ziebarth 
(2017) show that when a larger variety of food products became readily accessible after the fall 
of the Wall, East Germans consumed more novel Western food and gained more weight than 
West Germans. While communism first constrained consumer choice, the transformation 
period following reunification supported a further differentiation of consumption patterns. 
Culture is also reflected in tax morale, that is, the willingness to pay taxes. In fact, tax 
morale can be seen as a form of solidarity. A stronger preference for redistribution suggested 
by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) needs the support of honest taxpayers to have the 
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desired consequences. In line with this reasoning, Möhlmann (2014) documents a persistently 
higher tax morale in East Germany and no sign of quick convergence. We are not aware of data 
on tax morale before World War II. Yet preferences for communism expressed via higher 
communist vote shares before World War II and selective migration before 1961 suggest the 
possibility that East Germans might have had higher tax morale to begin with, in which case 
the effect of living under communism on tax morale might be over-estimated. 
Finally, evidence on how life satisfaction responds to circumstances has also been used 
to measure cultural values. For example, Van Hoorn and Maseland (2010) find that getting 
divorced hurts East Germans’ happiness less than it does for West Germans, implying that East 
and West Germans respond differently to the same circumstance. Considering a wide range of 
aspects, East Germans appear to be more likely to entertain cultural values conducive to 
economic performance, such as a stronger dislike of unemployment. The authors conclude that 
“the belief that economic differences between Eastern and Western Germany are a result of a 
communist cultural legacy may be largely a myth.” We would not go as far, as some of the 
studies discussed above show strong evidence of enduring effects of communism on cultural 
values. But our reservation is that the magnitude of effects attributed to the communist regime 
may in some cases be over-estimated. 
Gender Roles 
Several papers also examine gender-related aspects of the German experience of 
separation and reunification, including sex-role attitudes, female labor-force participation, 
gender-specific educational achievement, and family-formation behavior. 
East German institutions encouraged female employment, while the West German 
system deterred women, in particular mothers, from full-time employment. Using the German 
General Social Survey, Bauernschuster and Rainer (2012) show that East Germans are 
significantly more likely to hold egalitarian sex-role attitudes than West Germans, with no sign 
of convergence after reunification. Campa and Serafinelli (2019) present similar results on sex-
role attitudes using the German Socioeconomic Panel and a regression discontinuity design 
focused on areas around the inter-German border. Furthermore, positive attitudes towards 
female employment are stronger in areas where growth in female employment was larger. 
Lippmann et al. (2020) show that East German women contribute a larger share to household 
income. At the same time, West German women who contribute more to household income 
also put in more housework hours. 
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To what extent might these differences be influenced by pre-separation history of the 
sort we discussed earlier? Wyrwich (2017) presents detailed analyses of female labor-force 
participation in 1925 and after World War II and addresses the concern we raised by using 
difference-in-differences estimation. However, Beblo and Görges (2018) find no substantial 
gender differences in preferences for work between what would later become East and West in 
pre-World War II data. The key difference here seems to be that they look at female labor-force 
participation as a share of the total, whereas it seems more natural to look at female labor-force 
participation rates, which do differ between East and West as we show above following 
Wyrwich (2019). To the extent that there is substantial persistence in female labor-force 
participation, at least some of the effect attributed to communism by the literature on gender 
norms in the labor market may pick up persistence. 
Going beyond the labor market, Lippmann and Senik (2018) show that the stereotypical 
underperformance of girls in math is sharply lower in the regions of former East Germany, in 
contrast with those of former West Germany. The difference is not explained by differences in 
economic conditions or teaching styles across the former political border. A potential concern 
about pre-existing differences relates to long-lasting Protestant-Catholic differences across 
Germany and the smaller gender gap in Protestant areas (Becker and Woessmann 2008).  
In another study of socialist education, Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella (2016) start from 
the observation that access to college was restricted under communism. With reunification, 
high-school graduates had more choice over their post-secondary education. To estimate the 
effect of socialist schooling on tertiary education, they exploit sharp birth-date cutoffs for 
school entrance that led to variation in the length of exposure to the East German education 
system. The authors show that an additional year of socialist schooling decreased the probability 
of obtaining a college degree for both genders and negatively affected several indicators of the 
labor-market prospects for men. This methodology is unaffected by the arguments we raised. 
The results suggest that growing up under socialist education had real effects on labor-market 
careers, especially for men. 
Finally, nonmarital births are the norm in Eastern Germany (58.1 percent of all births in 
2009), whereas they are the exception (26.5 percent) in Western Germany (Klüsener and 
Goldstein 2016). As discussed earlier, differences in nonmarital births predate the 1945 division 
of Germany, showing that at least some of the East-West difference is likely the result of long-
run persistence in attitudes toward gender.  
Overall, while the impact of the socialist regime on gender roles seems beyond doubt, 
numerically some of the results in the literature are likely over-estimated because of the pre-
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existing differences in female labor-force participation and the stronger historical drive for 
gender equality in the largely Protestant East. 
Conclusion 
The separation into the communist German Democratic Republic and the capitalist 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and their reunification in 1990 both happened rapidly 
and largely unexpectedly. This does not necessarily mean, however, that these events constitute 
a natural experiment that randomly assigned similar populations to two different political 
regimes. We show that, in fact, the East and West German populations differed already before 
World War II. For instance, people in what would later become the communist East were more 
likely to be working class, less likely to be self-employed, more likely to vote for the communist 
party, less likely to attend church, and more likely to experience female labor-force 
participation. To the extent that such differences persist over time, they likely introduce an 
upward bias in estimated effects of communist exposure on outcomes such as lack of 
entrepreneurship, left-leaning political preferences, lack of community participation, and equal 
gender roles.  
The East was also more heavily affected by war-related damages, dismantling, and 
reparation costs to the occupying forces in the immediate aftermath of World War II. 
Furthermore, roughly one in five people living in the East in 1945 migrated to the West before 
the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As this out-migration was highly selective, this 
creates an additional source for potentially persisting East-West differences. Thus, any East-
West differences in reunified Germany cannot necessarily be interpreted as a pure effect of 
communism. Furthermore, evidence of pre-World War II differences persisting over many 
decades suggests that convergence between the two parts of Germany may take longer than 
commonly thought. 
With this background in mind, is there an effect of communism in the German case? 
The answer is certainly yes—but each research question requires individual consideration of 
the aforementioned challenges. More robust evidence for the impact of political systems comes 
from the convergence of some economic behaviors and political (more than social) attitudes 
between the two parts of Germany after reunification. Living under the East German regime 
also seems to have affected consumption patterns persistently. Trust in the state may have been 
affected by German separation but has converged between East and West after reunification. 
Gender roles may have been affected along several dimensions, but female labor-force 
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participation and fertility behavior also appear to have a strong component of persistence dating 
back far before World War II. 
The broader lesson is that researchers should not be too quick to take the formation of 
political systems as exogenous. Given that political preferences are endogenous, for instance, 
to previous experiences (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2015), political systems may become 
endogenous too. This is obvious in the case of revolutions initiated by populations unhappy 
with their current political system. But even when outside powers initiate a regime transition 
and when borders are redrawn, any “effect” of the new regime should be carefully assessed 
with regards to pre-existing conditions and selective migration, as those unsatisfied with the 
regime change might migrate out, leaving behind those who are more disposed to go along with 
the new system. 
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 Figure 1: GDP per Capita and Life Expectancy in East and West Germany, 1925-2010 
GDP per capita 
 
Life expectancy 
 
Notes: GDP data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and exclude Berlin. Source: Rosés and Wolf (2018), own 
calculations. Pre-1950 life expectancy data comprise the states of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttemberg (equi-
weighted average) for West Germany and Thuringia and Saxony for East Germany. Source: Wagner (2008), own 
calculations. From 1950 onwards, life expectancy data comprise the respective entire territories. Source: Luy 
(2020). Vertical lines represent German separation (1949) and reunification (1990).  
  
 Figure 2: German Post-World War II Occupation Zones, Pre-World War II Provinces, and 
End-of-War Frontline  
 
Notes: Occupation zones in post-war Germany, highlighting the Soviet zone (red and purple), the inner German 
border (heavy black line), and the zone from which American forces withdrew in July 1945 (purple). With minimal 
exceptions, the ultimate border between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the years 1949-1990 follows the pre-World War II province borders, the border proposed in the EAC protocols 
in 1944 and 1945, as well as the Western border of the Soviet occupation zone from 1945-1949 (depicted). Source: 
Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1975. Library of Congress, Catalog Card Number 
75-619027. 
  
 Figure 3: The Working-class Share in 1925: Spotting the GDR Before It Existed 
 
Notes: Colors refer to quintiles. Missing data imputed by nearest neighbor. Source: Own 
depiction based on county-level census data in Falter and Hänisch (1990).  
  
 Table 1: East-West Differences before World War II  
 Full German Band around the East-West border 
 sample <= 200 km <= 100 km Border counties 
Economic outcomes     
Working-class share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.356*** 0.340*** 0.363*** 0.369*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) 
GDR 0.118*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) 
Manufacturing employment share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.357*** 0.332*** 0.349*** 0.341*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.028) 
GDR 0.083*** 0.121*** 0.110*** 0.031 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.039) 
Self-employment share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.273*** 0.281*** 0.263*** 0.269*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) 
GDR -0.084*** -0.093*** -0.068*** -0.039** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017) 
Political preferences     
Communist (KPD) vote share (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
GDR 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.021* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Left (SPD+USPD+KPD) vote share (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.254*** 0.274*** 0.307*** 0.316*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.027) 
GDR 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.100*** 0.028 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.037) 
Culture     
Protestant share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.490*** 0.602*** 0.663*** 0.754*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.051) 
GDR 0.420*** 0.307*** 0.240*** 0.099 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.031) (0.068) 
Church attendance (1900-1910)     
Constant (West) 0.554*** 0.651*** 0.623*** 0.641*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.032) (0.066) 
GDR -0.163*** -0.266*** -0.228*** -0.184** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.036) (0.076) 
Gender Roles     
Female labor-force participation (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.325*** 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.308*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) 
GDR 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.037** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016) 
Extramarital birth ratio (1937)     
Constant (West) 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
GDR 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.014* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Observations (vote shares) 854 468 244 59 
Notes: Each pair of “GDR” and “Constant (West)” estimates reflect the result of a separate regression. County-
level analyses. Distance to border based on county centroids. Robust standard errors in parentheses: significance 
at * 10, ** 5, *** 1 percent. Data sources: economic outcomes, political preferences, and Protestant share: Falter and 
Hänisch (1990); Protestant church attendance: Hölscher (2001); female labor-force participation: Wyrwich (2019); 
extramarital birth ratio: Klüsener and Goldstein (2016). For additional details, see Appendix Table A1. 
 Table 2: Comparison of East-West Movers and Local West Germans in 1939: Retrospective 
Evidence 
 East-West movers Local West Germans 
Occupation in 1939   
Unskilled worker 0.154 0.301 
Farmer (self-employed) 0.057 0.053 
Family worker 0.094 0.113 
Skilled worker 0.155 0.196 
White-collar worker 0.304 0.203 
Civil servant 0.135 0.061 
Self-employed 0.101 0.072 
Education   
Basic school (Volksschule) 0.392 0.608 
Secondary and professional school 0.490 0.348 
High school 0.042 0.014 
Technical school 0.027 0.012 
University 0.049 0.019 
Observations  2,288 104,128 
Notes: Retrospective evidence from German Microcensus 1971. Shares in sample population. Individuals still in 
education or outside the labor force in 1939 as well as expellees from formerly German territories excluded.  
  
 Table 3: Evidence on East-West Differences 
Paper, Outcome Data Empirical Approach Result 
Economic outcomes 
   
Fuchs-Schündeln 
and Schündeln 
(2005): Saving 
SOEP 1992-
2000 
East-West comparison: 
GDR vs. FRG resident; 
civil servants vs. other 
occupations 
Precautionary wealth as share of total wealth in 
East amounts to twice that in West after 
reunification 
Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2008): Saving 
SOEP 1992-
2000 
East-West comparison: 
GDR vs. FRG resident 
before 1990 
East Germans have higher saving rates than West 
Germans; East-West gap increasing in age at 
reunification; per cohort, gap declining over time 
Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2009): Job 
satisfaction 
SOEP 1990-
2000 
Sample of East 
Germans: self-
employed vs. non-self-
employed 
Self-employment, mostly prohibited in GDR, 
possible after reunification; self-employed in East 
report higher job satisfaction than the employed, 
even controlling for income and hours worked 
Fritsch and 
Wyrwich (2014): 
Entrepreneurship 
Regional 
data 1925, 
1984-2005 
East-West comparison 
over nearly 100 years 
Entrepreneurship rates highly persistent from pre-
WW II to today; West Germany had higher 
entrepreneurship already before WW II 
Laudenbach et al. 
(2019): Stock-
market 
participation 
Retail inves-
tor accounts 
of a broker, 
2004-2012 
East-West comparison 
and treatment intensity 
(“communist cities”) 
East Germans invest less in stock market, more 
likely to hold stocks of companies in communist 
countries (China, Russia, Vietnam); effects 
stronger when exposed to communist priming 
Goldfayn-Frank 
and Wohlfart 
(2020): Inflation 
expectation 
Bundesbank Panel of 
Household Finances (PHF) 
2011, 2014; GfK Consumer 
Climate Survey 2000-2016; 
Eurobarometer 2000-2016 
East-West 
comparison 
East Germans expect higher inflation than West 
Germans 
Political preferences 
   
Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln (2007): 
Preferences for 
state intervention 
SOEP 1996-2002 East-West 
comparison: GDR 
vs. FRG residents 
before 1990 
East Germans are more in favor of state 
intervention in social services, insurance, and 
redistribution; stronger for older cohorts; slow 
convergence 
Svallfors (2010): 
Attitudes to state 
intervention 
International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gram (ISSP), Role 
of Government, 
1990, 1996, 2006 
East-West 
comparison, focus 
on convergence 
Considerable convergence in attitudes between 
East and West Germany: Attitudes in West 
Germany are completely stable while attitudes in 
the East become more similar to those in the West 
Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2011): Solidarity 
Laboratory ex-
periments in Mag-
deburg and Essen, 
1995 and 2009 
East-West 
comparison, focus 
on convergence 
East Germans show consistently less fairness and 
willingness to cooperate in solidarity games; there 
has been no convergence in the 20 years after the 
reunification 
Avdeenko (2018): 
Voting for 
socialist party 
aggregate-level: 
panel of federal ele-
ction results, 1990- 
2013; individual-
level: SOEP 
Within-(former)-
GDR comparison 
of border and 
non-border areas 
Voters who lived close to inner-German border, 
where life was harder, are less likely to lean 
toward the successor party to East Germany’s 
communists  
Carl (2018): 
Attitudes toward 
immigration 
SOEP 1999-2016 Duration of life 
under 
communism 
Concerns about immigration are stronger the 
longer an individual has spent under communism 
Culture  
   
Rainer and Siedler 
(2009): Social and 
institutional trust 
ALLBUS 1991, 
1994, 2002 
East-West com-
parison, focus on 
convergence 
East Germans have significantly lower social trust 
without signs of convergence; institutional trust in 
East converges towards West 
van Hoorn and 
Maseland (2010): 
Values 
SOEP 
1991-2006 
East-West differences in 
transforming situational 
factors into happiness 
East Germans appear to entertain values more 
conducive to economic growth 
(continued on next page) 
 Table 3 (continued) 
Paper, Outcome Data Empirical Approach Result 
Bauernschuster et al. 
(2012): Self-reliance 
ALLBUS 1991, 
1994, 1998, 
2000, and 2004 
East-West comparison East Germans show lower self-reliance 
conditional on regional differences in 
current economic development 
Boenisch and 
Schneider (2013): 
Preferences for 
geographic mobility 
SOEP 1994 Eastern origin as IV 
for club membership 
and church attendance 
Those who grew up in the GDR are less 
likely to be members of clubs, or to attend 
church, which in turn relates to lower 
geographic mobility 
Heineck and Süssmuth 
(2013): Trust, risk, 
fairness, cooperation 
SOEP 2003 and 
2008 
East-West comparison, 
focus on convergence 
East-West convergence in risk preferences, 
less so in trust, close to none in cooperation 
Friehe and Mechtel 
(2014): Conspicuous 
consumption 
Income and ex-
penditure sample 
1993, 2008 
East-West comparison Conspicuous consumption more important 
in East Germany 
Möhlmann (2014): 
Tax morale 
World Value Survey 2006; 
European Values Survey 
2008; ALLBUS 2000, 2002; 
ISSP Religion II 1998; ISSP 
Citizenship 2004; European 
Social Survey 2004 
East-West 
comparison, focus 
on convergence 
Persistent gap in tax morale and no sign of 
quick convergence 
Dragone and 
Ziebarth (2017): 
Novelty 
consumption 
German National 
Health Interview 
and Examination 
Survey 1991 and 
1998 
Difference-in-
differences: East-West 
food consumption 
1991-1998  
East Germans consumed more novel 
Western food and gained more weight than 
West Germans when a larger variety of 
food products became readily accessible 
after the fall of the Wall 
Friehe and 
Pannenberg (2020): 
Time preferences 
SOEP 2008 and 
2013 
East-West comparison; 
treatment intensity; 
RDD around border 
East Germans are less present biased 
Gender roles 
   
Bauernschuster and 
Rainer (2012): Sex-
role attitudes 
ALLBUS 1980-
2010 (biannual) 
East-West comparison, 
focus on convergence 
East Germans are significantly more likely 
to hold egalitarian sex-role attitudes than 
West Germans; no evidence of convergence 
Fuchs-Schündeln 
and Masella (2016): 
Tertiary education 
Microcensus, 
2005-2008 
Difference-in-
differences estimation 
Additional year of socialist education 
decreases probability of college degree and 
affects labor-market outcomes for men 
Klüsener and 
Goldstein (2016): 
Extramarital fertility 
County data 
1878, 1937, 2009 
East-West comparison 
over 140 years 
Non-marital births the norm in East, but not 
in West; difference predates 1945 division  
Wyrwich (2017): 
Female labor-force 
participation 
County data 1925, 
1939, 1996-2015; 
ALLBUS 1996-2012 
East-West 
comparison over 
nearly 100 years 
Substantial evidence of persistence in 
female labor-force participation 
Beblo and Görges 
(2018): Gender gap 
in work preferences 
ALLBUS 1991, 
1998 and 2012 
East-West 
comparison, focus on 
convergence 
Substantial East-West difference in gender 
gap in work preferences directly after 
reunification; no convergence thereafter 
Campa and 
Serafinelli (2019): 
Sex-role attitudes 
SOEP and 
ALLBUS 
East-West comparison; 
RDD around inner-
German border 
Eastern women more likely to place 
importance on career success; East 
Germans less likely to hold traditional 
gender-role attitudes; effect stronger where 
female employment growth faster 
Lippmann et al. 
(2020): Gender 
norms 
SOEP 1991-2012 Outcomes regressed on 
dummy for wife higher 
earner, interacted with 
East Germany dummy 
More equal breadwinner norm in East: 
women can earn more than their husband 
without having to increase housework 
hours, put their marriage at risk, or 
withdraw from labor market 
Lippmann and Senik 
(2018): Math scores 
PISA-E, SOEP East-West comparison Gender gap in math achievement is lower 
in former GDR 
Notes: Authors’ own elaboration based on literature survey. See main text for more detailed discussion.  
 Table A1: East-West Differences before World War II: Additional Outcomes  
 Full German Band around the East-West border 
 sample <= 200 km <= 100 km Border counties 
Economic outcomes     
Agricultural employment share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.352*** 0.382*** 0.357*** 0.406*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.033) 
GDR -0.128*** -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.051 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.043) 
Health sector employment share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDR 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political preferences     
SPD vote share (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.201*** 0.234*** 0.268*** 0.277*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.025) 
GDR 0.104*** 0.070*** 0.034** 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) 
Zentrum+BVP vote share (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.363*** 0.310*** 0.258*** 0.240*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.041) 
GDR -0.320*** -0.258*** -0.184*** -0.086 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.058) 
DNVP vote share (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.148*** 0.191*** 0.220*** 0.229*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017) 
GDR 0.104*** 0.039*** -0.011 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.034) 
Voter turnout (1924)     
Constant (West) 0.776*** 0.800*** 0.825*** 0.822*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
GDR 0.051*** 0.032*** 0.005 -0.018 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
Culture     
Catholic share (1925)     
Constant (West) 0.491*** 0.380*** 0.317*** 0.226*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.029) (0.052) 
GDR -0.438*** -0.326*** -0.255*** -0.094 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.069) 
Jewish share (1910)     
Constant (West) 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDR -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Notes: Each pair of “GDR” and “Constant (West)” estimates reflect the result of a separate regression. County-
level analyses. Distance to border based on county centroids. Robust standard errors in parentheses: significance 
at * 10, ** 5, *** 1 percent. Data source: Falter and Hänisch (1990). 
  
 Figure A1: Spotting the GDR Before It Existed: Economic Outcomes 
 Manufacturing employment share (1925) Self-employment share (1925) 
  
Notes: Colors refer to quintiles on each variable. Missing data imputed by nearest neighbor. Source: Own depiction 
based on county-level census data in Falter and Hänisch (1990).  
Figure A2: Spotting the GDR Before It Existed: Political Preferences 
 Communist (KPD) vote share (1924) Left-party vote share (1924) 
 
Notes: Left parties include KPD, SPD, and USPD. Colors refer to quintiles on each variable. Missing data imputed 
by nearest neighbor. Source: Own depiction based on county-level data of Reichstag election in December 1924 
in Falter and Hänisch (1990).  
 Figure A3: Spotting the GDR Before It Existed: Culture 
 Protestant share (1925) Church attendance (1900-1910) 
 
Notes: Colors refer to quintiles on each variable. Missing data imputed by nearest neighbor. Source: Own depiction 
based on census data at the county level in Falter and Hänisch (1990) and Protestant church attendance data at the 
church-district level in Hölscher (2001).  
Figure A4: Spotting the GDR Before It Existed: Gender Roles 
 Female labor-force participation (1925) Extramarital birth ratio (1937) 
 
Notes: Colors refer to quintiles on each variable. Missing data imputed by nearest neighbor. Source: Own depiction 
based on county-level data on female labor-force participation provided by Wyrwich (2019) and extramarital birth 
ratio provided by Klüsener and Goldstein (2016).  
